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Religion and the Meaning of Life: An Existential Approach, by Clifford  Williams. 
Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp vi + 189. $27.99 (paperback).
MARK S. MCLEOD-HARRISON, George Fox University
No one can fairly accuse Clifford Williams of working out his philosoph-
ical views in an ungrounded way. From tramping with hobos to inter-
viewing people who walked away from suicide to writing on the role of 
desire in religious belief, Williams’s work consistently pays attention to 
how we actually live our lives. Yet his work is analytically clear, accessible 
to folks outside the ivory tower, and informed by contemporary scholar-
ship. Religion and the Meaning of Life is no exception.
William unravels a paradox wrapped around two poles: that we long 
for meaning in our lives and that we so often don’t think about meaning. 
Both poles of the paradox are connected in theistic belief. He assumes the 
following: God exists, there is an afterlife with God, morality is objective, 
and morality’s being objective is required for a meaningful life. He does 
not assume that belief in God or the afterlife are necessary to live a mean-
ingful life but argues for the “enhancement thesis,” viz., that meaning-
fulness in life is enhanced if one holds those beliefs and they are true. 
Williams connects meaningfulness and the worthwhile but does not iden-
tify them. In addition, there is a clear link between the worthwhile and 
good inner states in the context of the pursuit of a good life.
Chapter 1 asks why we should care about meaning, providing two 
answers. First, we desire meaning and hence an expectation exists that 
we should care about it. We have any number of desires that are, in effect, 
desires for meaning. Some are for intrinsic goods, others for right pleas-
ures. These often overlap. After detailing some of these—non-competitive 
play, deep friendship—Williams notes deep longings, the sort of yearn-
ing attended by wistfulness and even melancholy when one doesn’t have 
the desired thing. It is puzzling, given these deep longings, that one ever 
feels indifferent to meaning in one’s life. Here Williams provides seven 
reasons why one might feel indifferent: busyness, lack of energy, illness 
and physical exhaustion, suffering, constricted circumstances, depression, 
and unbelief in God. Recognizing that any one of us may experience these 
states occurrently, we shouldn’t be surprised that some of us don’t seem 
to care about meaning. On the other hand, caring about meaning is also 
dispositional and so we should continue to be puzzled about the lack of 
concern for meaning.
A second reason for caring about meaning: God made us with desires 
for intrinsic goods and right pleasures and God desires that we fulfill our 
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desires for a meaningful life. Further, God made us with a capacity for 
desire fulfillment and fulfillment of such desires is itself an intrinsic good. 
Chapter 1 continues by arguing that caring about meaning can be fit into 
both duty and happiness-based moral theories, but it is most at home in 
virtue theory.
Chapter 2 takes up the topic of boredom, distinguishing everyday from 
existential boredom. The former is often situative, viz., where one loses 
interest in the particular thing one is currently doing and hence loses the 
desire to do it. The latter is the loss of desire altogether, or at least the 
near-total loss of desire—one can be existentially bored and yet continue 
to eat. But the most relevant issue is whether one has also lost one’s inter-
est in being interested. Existential boredom occurs when one loses interest 
in nearly everything but finds the situation intolerable because one wants 
to be interested. Such boredom can bring terror which engenders dread, 
suicidal thoughts, and agony (among other powerful states). I’ll return 
to those states momentarily. To avoid boredom itself, one may use eva-
sive tactics such as engaging in physical activities not, of course, because 
one thinks them interesting but simply to avoid boredom. Williams notes 
two tactics in particular: mental activity or moral/religious activity. Such 
activities find a home in Sartre’s framework of bad faith where one spends 
one’s life evading one’s responsibility.
Where evasion fails, however, one may face dread, agony, despair, frus-
tration, rebellion, and suicidal thoughts. Using Camus’s Sisyphus as a foil, 
Williams notes how Sisyphus cannot evade his situation. There is only the 
rolling of the rock up the hill. Rather, he rebels, disdaining the gods, and, 
according to Camus, “one must imagine Sisyphus happy.” That happi-
ness, though, cannot be true happiness. Of course, such rebellion may be 
against God. If the rebellion, dread, agony, and so forth are bad enough, 
one might end one’s life. Such an act, however, cuts off the possibility of 
answering “the call from eternity” to turn away from these negative states 
and reengage meaningfulness. Williams points to Kierkegaard’s proposal 
of several things that might help: the concern of inwardness, being will-
ing to be transformed, enunciating what one is feeling, quietness, and a 
longing for God. These are, respectively, a concern for one’s current state 
of boredom, a fervent passion for change, putting into words and owning 
how one feels, being quiet, waiting, not being distracted by the crowd, and 
the belief that longing for God makes one more open to hearing from God.
Chapter 3 uses Ernest Becker’s The Denial of Death to understand immor-
tality projects and vital lies we use to deny the terror of death, understood 
both as extinction and meaninglessness. Because of extinction at death, 
one can never know if one’s life was meaningful. In response, we engage 
in immortality projects, things that will turn us from being small to being 
large. Making money, the use of technology, and, Williams adds, good 
projects—ones designed to help others but which aggrandize oneself—are 
examples. Such projects are often embedded in the “Reward Syndrome” 
wherein one compares one’s projects to others’ projects. Becker suggests 
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that most often immortality projects are one-dimensional when they could 
be transcendent. But the latter would require belief in the transcendent 
that Western culture has lost. This leads to the vital lie—self-deception 
that we can overcome death by our activities.
The solution to all this is rebirth—a death to the self living-in-fear-of-
death and rebirth as one who faces the truth. But Becker, according to 
Williams, says little about engaging goodness rather than simply living in 
tension with our own deaths and the inclination to lie to ourselves with 
immortality projects. Following Kierkegaard, Williams suggests that three 
things are necessary to engage goodness: increased attention to what is 
good, redirection of one’s root desires, and humility.
Chapter 4 engages how to acquire meaning in one’s life, considering 
four philosophical views about the acquisition, viz., achieving goals, being 
creative, having certain virtues and emotions, and giving and receiving 
love. Each of these ways is argued to be consistent with a theistic over-
lay and with each other. Chapter 5 asks whether and how the four ways 
of acquiring meaningfulness can help defeat thoughts of suicide. Taking 
on the project left unfulfilled by Camus’s thoughts on suicide, Williams 
engages a pragmatic and helpful approach to those with suicidal thoughts.
Chapters 6 and 7 return to God and life after death arguing that exis-
tential boredom can be relieved, new virtues can be taken on, and one 
can transcend oneself if God and the afterlife are real. Further, one who 
doesn’t believe in either of these should want them to be true because they 
enhance the meaningfulness of one’s life. Here we find the development 
of Williams’s enhancement thesis. Often theists conclude that life with-
out God would be meaningless whereas secular thinkers believe mean-
ingfulness can be rooted without God. Williams argues that belief in God 
enhances the meaningfulness of life. Meaningfulness comes in degrees 
and there is an objective value framework. These are important because 
Williams measures strength of meaning not against subjective likings but 
the quantity of intrinsic goods.
Chapter 6 argues that, given the above assumptions, the meaningful-
ness of one’s life can be enhanced in various ways, including belief in God. 
But such a being must also exist to ground an extension of meaningfulness. 
Further, belief must be of a rich type, including that God is loving, made 
humans for meaningfulness, and made us capable of loving God in return. 
The difference God makes in one’s meaning “quotient” comes through an 
additional total context (for how one should live life), additional emotions 
and virtues (love for, gratitude toward, and awe of God, for example), sat-
isfaction of the urge to transcend oneself (deep relationships with others, 
including God), and a cure for existential boredom (by engaging the ways 
of increasing meaning in the context of pleasing one’s Creator).
In an “existential move,” Williams argues that one who does not believe 
in God should be distressed. One can deny the enhancement thesis, be 
indifferent to it (even if it is true) or be distressed by it. Distress is the most 
rational reaction, for by missing what belief in God brings, one is missing 
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maximal excellence. Chapter 7 argues for a parallel enhancement thesis, 
viz., that belief in, and the truth of, life after death enhances meaningful-
ness in this life. The chapter proceeds by considering how the same four 
ways in which the meaningfulness of life can be enhanced by belief in God 
can be increased by belief in the afterlife.
Chapter 8 responds to four obstacles—unconscious motives, the lure 
of the crowd, dividedness, and constricted circumstances leading to suf-
fering. Sometimes these are overcome, sometimes not. Chapter 9 attends 
to how we should live so we can die well using Tolstoy’s The Death of 
Ivan Ilyich. To prepare oneself to die well one should be aware and atten-
tive, and develop traits opposite Ilyich. Don’t take inordinate delight in 
the power to crush others, take disproportionate pleasure in the trivial, or 
have excessive self-regard.
Now some comments and questions. First, the comments. It seems to me 
that the enhancement thesis is generally correct. I thought for many years 
that a life without both belief in, and the reality of, God would leave life 
without meaning. My views have shifted and I think Williams’s enhance-
ment thesis closer to the truth. My shift may have something to do with 
my Christian commitments having wavered of late, but Williams’s win-
some way of presenting his case is worth the read alone. Second, Williams 
displays a good deal of insight into human nature in this work. Some of 
that insight is no doubt learned from reading the existentialists but per-
haps more comes from the fact that Williams appears to pay close atten-
tion to the people with whom he talks in his day-to-day life. Observations 
based on those talks are used to good end in enlivening Williams’s argu-
ments. Third, the author’s style is clear and easy to read, making the book 
useful to a wide audience, certainly including, say, college sophomores.
Now the critical questions. Williams mentions, in parsing boredom, 
those bored in that they’ve lost all desire including the desire to have 
interests. Such people are not in existential boredom. They wouldn’t care 
one way or another if life is meaningful. Perhaps they might not care even 
whether they live or die. Such people are, in some sense, far worse off objec-
tively than the existentially bored. Given Williams’s existential concerns 
for real people, I wonder, for such people, would any of the arguments he 
supplies work? Would such a person be capable of a meaningful life? The 
truth of much of what Williams says seems to rely on the contingencies of 
human personality. Are such people just beyond existential reach?
A second question is about the application of Kierkegaard’s suggestions 
for overcoming existential boredom to move toward meaningfulness: the 
concern of inwardness, being willing to be transformed, enunciating what 
one is feeling, quietness, and a longing for God. It seems the ability to 
use such “tools” depends on already having some sense of the meaning-
fulness of life. There is, perhaps, a hint of circularity here. This is tied to 
the previous question. The existentially bored must, to be existentially 
engaged, at least be worried about the fact they are not interested in much. 
The ability to use these five tools of Kierkegaard seems to presume that 
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one is sufficiently existentially engaged with interests that one would 
not, in fact, be existentially bored or at least be prepared to overcome it. 
But what then is the real difference between the tools and simply being 
existentially bored?
A final question, and one that is quite personal, flows from my own life. 
It’s always a little shocking to hear about a suicide, even when you didn’t 
know the person. Let the reader be assured that I’m okay. Nevertheless, 
my late wife took her life after 11 years of suffering with lupus and a host 
of related illnesses. She was a Ph.D. candidate at Yale in history with a 
promising career in front of her. She never finished, her illness making 
her life smaller, seemingly, each day. She left me and our 11-year old son. 
In her journal entries from the several weeks before she died, she talked 
about going to see three people: her undergraduate mentor who had died 
too young from complications of a lung illness, a favorite student of hers 
who had died in a freak automobile accident six months before, and Jesus 
who died for us all. So far as I  know, she never doubted the reality of 
God, period. Evil in her own life and that of others intensely bothered her. 
She planned to dance with Jesus but not until they had a heart-to-heart in 
which the God she loved explained why there was so much pain in her, 
and others, lives.
She did not count her life as generally meaningless, but she did count 
evil as raising questions about the meaning of an individual life and saw 
that the presence of evil could disintegrate one’s soul. Although Williams 
notes that evil raises questions about his work on meaning, he does not 
take them up. But I wonder if he shouldn’t have added a chapter on the 
subject. In the end, my wife lost hope, as her final note indicated. But it 
wasn’t hope in God or hope in an afterlife she lost. She merely lost hope 
of getting better in this life. The loss of that hope seemed to undermine her 
commitment to stay alive and she took continuing in this life to be mean-
ingless or at least pointless. Of course, I did not, and cannot, know her 
final thoughts, but I knew her well. It appears that she exchanged what 
she took, at its end, to be a pointless life for a better, more meaningful one. 
I wonder, what would Williams have said to my late wife had he been able 
to talk with her before she took her life? I’m guessing Williams might have 
had some insightful, pastorally real, things to say. Or maybe he would 
merely have sat with her in loving silence.
It’s hard, though, to write a silent book. And indeed, the book Williams 
has written is not silent but filled with insightful observations, good argu-
ments, and clear presentation.
